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Bolshevism in China 
The first edition of this work appeared in our 
"Monthly Documentation" of August 1932 
I. - Introduction. 
Events in China are little known and little understood 
by the great Western public, for several reasons : 
1. We follow these events with difficulty owing to the 
strange names, which are confusing and difficult to remember. 
These names, moreover, are spelt in many different ways in 
the agency messages and on the maps. 
2. We are ignorant of the mentality of the Chinese, 
which is based on their old buddhist religion, and we do not 
understand their exasperated nationalism, which the Bolsheviks 
know so well how to turn to account. 
3. What is going on in the Far East seems to have little 
to do with us, occupied as we are with the crisis. This first 
impression is very mistaken ; the troubles in Asia reduce 
the consumption of half the globe, and are thus one of the 
chief causes of the world crisis. 
4. Finally, through ignorance or parti pris, certain jour-
nalists have described events in China in a tendencious manner, 
and circles in close touch with the League of Nations seem 
little better informed. 
* 
* * 
For all these reasons it has seemed to us worth while to 
summarise the information, so far as it agrees, which we possess 
on t his burning topic of the day. It comes from very diverse 
sources, well-acquainted with the country, and is confirmed 
by t he directions given by the Comintern and by dozens of 
recent publications of which we need only quote the following : 
Dr. jur. u. Dr. med . Gustav RITTER VON KREITNER: Hinter 
China steht Moskau, 1932. 
Dr. LEGENDRE: L a crise mondiale. L'Asie contre l'Europe, 1932. 
Dr. Jur. Peter ScHMITZ S. V. D. : Der Bolschewismus in China, 
1931. 
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J. C. BALET: La Mandchourie, 1932. 
Jean RonEs: La Chine nationaliste, 1931. 
Revue des Deux Mondes of the 1st June 1932: Les affaires 
d' Extreme-Orient. 
E. FxscHLE (of the Basle Mission): 16 mois de captivite chez les 
brigands chinois, 1931. 
Yin PIN : U ne jeune chinoise a l' armee revolutionnaire (translation 
from the Chinese). 
We recommend in particular the first of these works, 
which we have largely drawn upon. The two last are by eye-
witnesses : they give an idea of the mentality of the Chinese 
communists and of what is going on in the regions they 
dominate. 
II. - Old China. 
Long before the Christian era, when Europe was still 
barbarian, the immense country of China enjoyed a very advan-
ced civilisation. Then a more or less communist revolution 
destroyed the old patriarchal customs and plunged the country 
into chaos for several centuries. Civil war and famine decimated 
the population. 
Finally, five hundred years before Christ, the moral doctrine 
of Confucius, based on the ancient religious principles of Buddha, 
arrived to re-establish the order of things of the good old times, 
this time in a fashion as far as possible immutable. The present 
tragedy of the Chinese people arises from the fact that it 
succeeded too well. 
* 
* * 
As in other ancient civilisations, the family was the basic 
cell of the Chinese State ; its head, the eldest male, had very 
extensive rights, but he had to govern solely in the general 
interest, rather by the example of his virtues than by force. 
He it was who had to educate the young, distribute and direct 
the work, and ensure the means of existence of all. The young 
had to honour their elders and obey them : all had to render 
real homage to their ancesters . 
The emperor had the same patriarchal authority over his 
subjects : the worshipped Heaven, of which he was the Son. 
The doctrine of Confucius preached politeness, good 
manners, honesty, a happy medium in all things. It condemned 
the useless resort to force and all excess. 
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This fine doctrine succeeded in imposing itself on the 
Chinese people. It became the sole foundation of their collective 
life, the basis of education and instruction, just as the Mussulmans 
until recently confined themselves to teaching Arab script 
and commenting on the Koran. 
The chief aim of this doctrine, which was finally to assure 
the established order and prevent the return of unfortunate 
political experiences, was marvellously achieved, and the 
Chinese became fundamentally conservative. Old customs 
regulated all the details of their existence, from birth to death. 
* 
* * 
This Chinese civilisation was very levelling. The land was 
divided into small family properties and agriculturists formed 
the great majority of the people. Families which became too 
numerous were divided up, without ceasing their relations of 
mutual support; some went to exploit neighbouring properties, 
others undertook small trades. 
The artisans and traders also worked in families and grouped 
themselves into trade guilds, always directed according to the 
general interest. Family solidarity rendered charitable insti-
tutions superfluous. 
The villages and small towns were administered almost 
without expense and without police, the head of each family 
being responsible for its members, as the mayor of the locality 
became for those under his charge. 
The Emperor reigned through governors of provinces and 
disposed of a minimum of soldiers (about one per thousand 
of the population). About fifty Censors, highly honoured, 
inspected all the regions and saw that the officials, from top 
to bottom of the scale, worked for the good of all and that the 
people did not complain. They had the right to criticise even 
the Emperor. 
An extremely simple code assured the rights of the State 
and of the families. The penalties provided were very severe 
so that each felt himself well protected. 
It was mainly according to moral laws that the officials 
governed the people. These officials were chosen by competition ; 
the examinations, excluding all fraud, were based on the ancient 
moral laws. Anyone might present himself, for there were 
schools everywhere and poor families subscribed to send the 
cleverest of their young people. 
This administrative system was so practical that 20,000 
officials sufficed for the whole Empire. The taxes represented 
only 1°/0 of the revenue from the land, and served mainly 
for the upkeep of dykes and canals and for the distribution of 
food to the provinces affected by famine. 
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China was self-sufficing and took no notice of other nations. 
In short, the people lived modestly but happily. 
* 
* * 
From our point of view, this old and admirable civilisation 
had only one fault-it did not favour progress. It even excluded 
all desire for improvement ; one could not hope to do better 
than one's ancesters. 
Thus, for instance, the situation of women remained miser-
able, as it was everywhere in times of antiquity and as it still 
remains among primitive peoples. Chinese women must work, 
obey, and produce children; they had no rights. 
The fathers did not desire daughters, for only sons could 
assure the worship of the ancesters. To marry his heirs, the 
Chinaman chose a woman and made the presents necessary 
to the father ; the consent of the woman was never asked. 
In the towns especially, many Chinese women had their feet 
mutilated, which made it difficult for them to walk. In bad 
times, the sale of girls as slaves was by no means rare. 
Nor .. have the Chinese made any progress from the point 
of view of hygiene. They have always drunk the polluted 
waters of their rivers. Epidemics are still frequent, contagious 
diseases very widespread, and infant mortality high. 
Water transport, favoured by nature, has been developed, 
but in the interior of the country there are practically no roads ; 
they have not progressed beyond tracks for bearers. In the 
towns hand-drawn rickshaws are used, and wheel-barrows for 
the transport of goods. · 
The land is carefully cultivated, but without any modern 
appliances. Human manure is generally employed. 
III. - Foreign influences. 
The first European navigators who landed in China were 
able to e?tchange their goods freely, but abuses occurred and 
in 1857 foreign trade was placed under control and concentrated 
in the port of Canton . 
The English, little by little, got possession of the trade, 
and having acquired the monopoly of opium in India, introduced 
large quantities of the drug into China. It soon became so much 
in demand that the plices rose and Chinese exports-tea, cotton 
and porcelain-no longer sufficed for payment. Each year, 
large sums of money had to be added, which impoverished the 
country. The people began to complain . 
* 
* * 
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From 1800 onwards, trade in opium was forbidden in 
China, but the sellers made such large profits that they c,ontinued 
to smuggle it in, bribing the Chinese officials. The people 
complained more loudly. 
In 1839, an imperial commissary went and burned at 
Canton 20,000 cases of the stocks forbidden to the English 
traders. This was the cause of the " opium war " in which 
England, easily victorious, demanded possession of Hongkong, 
an indemnity, the opening to trade of five ports-Canton, Amoy, 
Fouchow, Ning-po, and Shanghai, as well as consular jurisdiction 
over her nationals. China declared herself no longer opposed 
to the entry of opium, but she prohibited the use of it (which 
did not prevent its consumption, as the bad habit had taken 
hold). Henceforward, England was able to import also her 
cotton goods at prices which killed the competition of the 
native artisans and ruined the peasant cotton growers. 
The people, who had already had to pay the heavy costs 
of the war, revolted. This was the " great revolt of Tai-ping ". 
Foreign trade suffered by this sanguinary 14 years revolution, 
to such an extent that England recommenced the war, with 
the aid of France, to preserve the commercial advantages obtained 
and finally to save the Dynasty, which was seriously threatened. 
The Chinese Government had accumulated enormous debts. 
The payment of the interest necessitated the institution of 
maritime customs, directed by foreigners, and internal customs, 
from which they obtained exemption. All kinds of industrial 
merchandise began to flow in, ruining more and more the native 
artisans. 
China had always despised the military profession. She 
found herself without means of defence. Despite her protests, 
she was further deprived of Annam, Tonkin, and certain conces-
sions on her territory, where administration, justice and police 
were in the hands of foreigners. 
Then these latter, in order to take advantage of cheap 
labour, wished to create industries in China itself. 
The Emperor was opposed to this, but the Japanese made 
war on him and caused him to capitulate in 1895. They further 
demanded Formosa and 200 million gold taels. This defeat 
of a great Empire by a small yellow country greatly affected 
Chinese pride. 
The other Powers, one after the other, then required 
" compensation ". Russia obtained Port Arthur, Germany 
Kow-chow, England Wei-hai-wei. They succeeded also in 
obtaining concessions of railways. Finally, they declared among 
themselves that they would reserve " spheres of influence", 
Russia in Chinese Turkestan, Outer Mongolia and Northern 
Manchuria, Japan in Southern Manchuria and at Fukien, 
Germany at Shantung, etc. 
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IV. - The beginnings of the Revolution. 
These constant capitulations, the debts and the heavy 
taxes had exasperated the Chinese against foreigners and against 
the Emperor. The general mentality was also being profoundly 
changed by contact with Europeans; there began to be a 
desire to modernise China. 
In order to trade in the country and to create factories, 
the foreigners had had need of Chinese associates and employees. 
These latter had rapidly become rich and formed a new capitalist 
bourgeoisie, which adopted foreign mentality and manners ; 
honesty decreased. 
The big industries, installed in the important towns. had 
destroyed in these the good tradition of family labour and 
created a proletariat without any legal protection. Its shameful 
exploitation led to the formation of trade unions, which soon 
became Red. 
Many of the family properties had been bought from the 
indebted cultivators. The farmers who worked them were 
in a worse situation than that of the former proprietors. There 
was therefore great discontent also in the country districts. 
Young Chinese had gone in increasing numbers to study 
in Europe and in America, where they had discovered that their 
country was very much behind the times and had returned 
with the intention of bringing about a change. The number of 
students being educated in China itself had reached 1,600,000; 
their opinions were also revolutionary. 
Finally, the missions, with the best intentions in the world, 
contributed to unsettle many of the Chinese by turning them 
away from the beliefs upon which their ancient civilisation was 
based. 
A Reform Party, with very advanced ideas, was created in 
the Southern towns. It first acted through numerous secret 
societies, then openly and throughout the country. All the 
educated youths joined it. 
Thinking to consolidate his tottering power, the Emperor 
attempted to apply the ideas of this <<Young China ». In 1898, 
he suddenly decreed a modern constitution and a transformation 
of the State according to Western principles . Three months 
later, he was dethroned by his aunt, the Empress Tseu-Hi, who 
energetically re-established the old order of things. 
These changes had thrown the country into a ferment. 
The " Boxer " revolt broke out, aimed chiefly at foreigners. 
The German Minister was assassinated at Pekin and the Court 
fled to the mountains. European troops came to crush the 
revolt, and China once more had imposed on her a heavy 
indemnity (450 million taels). As guarantee of payment, she had 
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to abandon all her customs and the tax on salt. The political 
.and financial situation became still more insoluble. 
The Imperial Government tried once more to decree a new 
constitution and to set up a modern army, but it was too late. 
In 1911, the Republic was proclaimed at Shanghai and Nankin 
with Sun-Yat-Sen as President. 
As the Great Powers wanted no more civil war, the Dynasty 
itself proclaimed the Republic under the dictatorship of Yuan-Shi 
Kai. This latter restored unity in the country and then sought 
to re-constitute the Empire in his own favour. He had just 
succeeded nominally when, faced with the opposition of the 
Centre and the South, he abdicated, handed over the power to 
Sun-Yat-Sen and soon after died. 
Henceforward, there was anarchy. In the provinces, the 
generals seized the power on their own account, crushed the 
population with taxes, levied fresh soldiers by force and made 
war on one another to obtain possession of the rich regions. 
The Central Government was no longer obeyed. 
Cleverly distributing subsidies, Japan acquired great 
influence in the Northern Provinces, where the generals, thanks 
to her, were able to pay their troops and maintain relative order 
during the world war. Japan also profited by the war to take 
Tsingtau from the Germans and to obtain from the Government 
of Pekin the acceptance of her famous " 21 demands ", which 
were to give her the upper hand over the country. But an 
unexpected wave of patriotism arose against the Japanese and 
against the Government of Pekin. A scission occurred between 
the North and the South, and the leaders of the seven Southern 
provinces formed in 1918 at Canton a separate Confederation 
under the direction of the Governor of Kwantung. 
For several years, Sun-Yat-Sen, whose party had joined 
the Southern Confederation, tried in vain to obtain the support 
of the Great Powers against Japan, and then turned towards 
Moscow. 
* * * 
Before dealing with Soviet influence in China, we must 
quote the" three principles" of Sun-Yat-Sen, which, from the 
outset, served as the watch-word of the Republic. 
1. The individuals of the five races (Chinese, Manchu, 
Mongol, Mussulman and Thibetan) which compose the Chinese 
democracy, form one single people and are all equal. 
2. National sovereignty resides in the people. 
3. The people have the right to all the national resources. 
This third point, which is not very clear, favoured later 
the propaganda of Moscow. Sun-Yat-Sen himself commented 
upon it as follows : 
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" Communism is the ideal of the third principle... It 
is when the people have the idea of a community in everything 
that the aim of our third principle will be really attained." 
The revolutionary party, which took in 1912 the name of 
" Kuomintang ", still had in its political program : 
The complete reform of the economic structure of China~ 
The maintenance of good relations with all the Powers~ 
The autonomy of the Provinces. 
We have seen that this autonomy had the worst consequen-
ces : it led everywhere to the seizure of power by the generals" 
civil war and the shameful pillage of the people. 
* 
* * 
In principle, the Constitution gave the people (mainly · 
illiterate) the most extended rights-the right of referendum 
and of initiative and even the original right of revoking the 
officials of the government. 
In practice, the influence of the small " Kuomintang '" 
Party, organised on the model of the Russian Communist 
Party, was all-powerful at the elections. The representatives. 
of the peasants and of the artisans, who formed 90% of the 
population were excluded. Elected through interest, the deputies. 
did not work in the general interest. Sun-Yat-Sen remarked 
this himself : '' China has not yet learnt the best side of parlia-
mentarism. Its deputies are the most corrupt and venal in the 
whole world." 
Parliament was divided, like. the " Kuomintang ", into an 
extremist left wing and a right wing which desired, quite rightly, 
the establishment of a central government capable of repressing 
anarchy and laws improving the former state of affairs instead 
of overthrowing them. The majority of the extremists were 
men from the South. 
v. - Bolshevik influence. 
As soon as Lenin had assured his power over Russia,. 
he did his best to bolshevise Europe. His repeated failures 
caused him to try a turning movement through Asia, in order 
to destroy there the markets of the great industrial countries 
and thus create in the countries themselves a state of poverty 
favourable to the communist revolution. He openly declared 
this. 
His greatest efforts were directed to China, already in 
complete anarchy. He thought that if be could succeed in 
swallowing up this immense country in the Soviet Union, this 
latter would include nearly one-third of the population of the 
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globe, that the conquest of the rest of Asia would be thereby 
facilitated and that the inevitable battle against the West 
would then present itself under more favourable conditions. 
He sought in the first place to win over the Chinese provinces 
in the North, but without success, because Japanese influence 
was favourable to the maintenance of order. In Southern 
China, on the other hand, his clever delegate Karakhan easily 
succeeded in 1923 in arriving at an understanding with Sun-
Yat-Sen, whose three principles were very similar to those of 
the Communists. 
To win over Chinese public opinion, the Soviets declared 
themselves willing to treat on a footing of absolute equality 
.and began by renouncing all their concessions and their rights 
to extra-territoriality and to the Boxer indemnity. They under-
took to reorganise the Kuomintang and its government on the 
Soviet model and promised money, arms and the aid of numerous 
-civil and military experts. 
Borodin was appointed adviser to the Cantonese Govern-
ment and propaganda began on the nationalist basis. A crowd 
of Soviet agents arrived and set to work. It was necessary, 
in the first place, to train native propagandists ; then, by means 
-of demonstrations in the streets, speeches and posters, the 
people were won over by two well-chosen watchwords : '' Down 
with militarism ! " against the military leaders who were 
oppressing the country, and " Down with imperialism ! " against 
the hated foreigners. Communist theory was temporarily set 
on one side so as not to alienate the rich1traders, whose subsidies 
were necessary. 
This clever propaganda was aimed mainly at the students 
.and the industrial proletarians, who were more easy to reach 
.and to organise than the peasants. 
Many of the most capable of the Chinese intellectuals 
were sent to Russia, where special schools were created for 
them, such as the Sun-Yat-Sen University (which later became 
the Communist University) 1 . Generals were also sent for 
training to Moscow ; Chang-Kai-Chek, among others, returned 
.enchanted with what he had learned. 
The influence of Borodin became very visible at the 
Congress of the '' Kuomintang " at Canton in 1924. Sun-Yat-Sen 
there recommended the reorganisation of the party on a wider 
basis. It was necessary to admit the Communists, who had a 
great influence over the students and the proletariat ; it was 
necessary that there should be strict discipline in the party 
.and that a strong central government should be created as in 
1 Our " Montly Documentation" for May 1930 gave details of the 
<>rganisation at Moscow of propaganda institutes for the Far East, to 
which we would refer our readers. 
-12-
Russia. It was necessary to adopt a compulsory program :: 
its three principles, which he commented upon in the communist 
sense: 
The first point now recommended an aggressive " nation-
alism " against the foreigners and all their undertakings ; the 
second, the " sovereignty of the people " organised as in Russia ; 
the third, the equalisation of wealth. 
Finally, it was necessary to create an army of the party 
and General Galen (alias Blucher) offered to undertake this~ 
with the aid of numerous Soviet officers. The Congress approved 
everything. 
Galen began by creating a school of officers, which passed 
rapidly from 500 to 3,000 pupils and of which General Chang-
Kai-Chek took command on his return from Moscow. The 
new officers served as cadres of a Red Army, capable not only 
of fighting but of performing propaganda in the occupied 
regions. 
The agitation of the working masses was thus sustained 
by every means and numerous strikes disorganised the industries. 
Meanwhile, Sun-Yat-Sen was convoked to Pekin, where it 
was desired to reconstitute a central government for the whole of 
China. There he died in 1925, before an understanding could 
be arrived at. In the interest of communist propaganda, Borodin 
declared the author of the three principles the greatest man of 
China, greater even than Confucius, and sought to deify him 
as Lenin was deified in Russia. He was thenceforth officially 
worshipped and later a mausoleum was erected to him at great 
expense. 
This death caused difficulties in the party, for Borodin 
took advantage of it to increase his orientation to the Left 
and exclude opponents. Breaking definitely with Pekin, he 
started riots in the foreign concession<;, boycotts and general 
strikes, of which that at Hongkong lasted fifteen months and 
caused incalculable losses to England. A large number of the 
strikers were incorporated in the new Red army. 
He also habituated the Chinese little by little to the class 
war, for in order to support the numerous strikers he taxed 
the well-to-do Chinese very heavily. His exactions went so 
far that the organised traders of Canton at length closed their 
shops and told the population to shake off the intolerable yoke 
of the communists. They were crushed by the common people. 
armed in haste. 
In 1926 Borodin had become so powerful in the Kuomintang 
that the Chinese leaders feared that they would be completely 
set aside. Chang-kai-chek, commandant at Canton, took 
advantage of a trip by Borodin to Moscow to disarm the Reddest 
troops, dismiss the Soviet advisers, and deport the Chinese 
communists. 
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Unfortunately, the Chinese generals, adversaries of the 
Kuomintang, seized this opportunity to march against Canton. 
A general war recommenced. Chang-kai-chek was obliged to 
make peace with Borodin, who appointed him general-in-chief, 
and with the Soviets, who again sent a mass of officers, arms and 
munitions. 
While seeking to conquer new provinces by force of arms, 
Canton resumed its popular watchwords: "Down with impe-
rialism ! " and " Down with militarism ! " Political propaganda 
started to disorganise the rear-guard of the adversaries of the 
Kuomintang and enabled Chang-kai-chek to gain much ground. 
The Russian experts placed nuclei in the trades unions of the 
provinces as they were conquered and thus took possession of 
all the undertakings. " Reactionaries" were massacred and 
new Red armies were organised with the troops which surren-
dered. Wuhang 1 , in the centre of China on the Yang-tse-Kiang, 
was chosen as the new capital. 
At Hangkow, the English concession was sacked, despite 
the troops on guard, and England declared that she definitely 
abandoned it. This glorious victory over the foreigner was 
largely exploited by the Kuomintang, which continued to 
confiscate the goods of foreigners as well as those of the rich 
Chinese. 
Chang-kai-chek arrived at Shanghai while it was being 
sacked. He indignantly re-established order by force, chasing 
out the Soviet agents and executing the Chinese communists. 
He next acted in the same way at Nankin and created in that 
town a new executive committee completely anti-communist. 
1927. 
It was time ; the patience of the foreign troops was comple-
tely exhausted and there was a danger that they might begin 
to protect their nationals by arms. The reasonable Chinese 
condemned quite as much the communist excesses ; they rallied 
en masse to the new government of Nankin and encouraged it 
to continue the repression. 
Borodin had to flee to Russia with most of his agents. 
Mrs Sun-yat-sen followed him, cursing the counter-revolution 
and announcing that communist propaganda would continue, 
despite everything, until final success. 
Unfortunately, the Nankin government broke up into 
hostile fractions ; the generals no longer obeyed, and Chang-
kai-chek retired in disgust to Japan. The Northerners recom-
menced the war, but without success. As for the Red troops 
of the government of Wuhang, they were forced back to the 
1 Wuhang, which is not found on the maps, represents the agglomera-
tion of three large neighbouring towns - Wuchang, Hanyang, and 
Hankow. 
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south bank of the Yang-tse-kiang, where they established a 
Soviet government over 50 million inhabitants which, thanks 
to the support of Moscow, still holds solidly to this day. 
The disputes continued within the nationalist government. 
A second kuomintang was formed at Canton until the day 
when a communist putsch gave an opportunity for the Nankin 
troops to intervene. 
Chang-kai-chek was then recalled to try to restore unity. 
He began by strengthening his personal position by marrying 
the sister of Mrs Sun-yat-sen, which made him related to the 
most influential politicians ; then he set about preparing war 
against the generals of the North. As technical adviser he 
called in Colonel Bauer, former aide of Ludendorff. 
The campaign, well-prepared politically and militarily, 
took place in 1928 and ended in the submission of Shantung 
and of Chih-li. A certain unity was re-established, but large 
districts remained independent of the government of Nankin. 
The Kuomintang, which only numbered 400,000 members, 
reorganised its power by copying still more the Soviet system, 
which enables a small party to dominate an immense people 
by means of the army, the police and an entirely devoted bureau-
~racy. The principal military leaders distributed the important 
civil posts among their creatures, and Chang-kai-chek had from 
them onwards the upper hand over the government. 
New laws were decreed. Among other things, it was for-
bidden on pain of death to try to change the revolutionary 
line of the party (the three principles of Sun-Yat-sen). Finally, 
Nankin succeeded in getting itself officially recognised as the 
capital and foreign Powers sent their representatives there. 
In 1929, the Northern generals, Feng-Yu-Hsiang and 
Yen-Hsi-San, resumed hostilities against Nankin, at first 
beating the nationalist troops. The Communist armies of the 
centre of China took advantage of this to march on Canton. 
The situation appeared desperate and a new government was 
already installed in Pekin when Chang-kai-chek succeeded 
by his promises in obtaining the aid of Chang-hsui-liang, dictator 
of Manchuria, who took possession of Chih-li and advanced as 
far as Hoang-ho. The two Northern generals retired into the 
mountains of Shensi and Shansi, and the communist troops 
returned to their provinces. 
At the end of 1930, Chang-kai-chek desired to extirpate 
communism from the Central Provinces, where he had reigned 
for three years. He sent a first army of 50,000 men, who were 
beaten and passed over to the service of the Reds. A second 
army, much stronger, suffered the same fate at the beginning 
of 1931. 
Chang-kai-chek then took command in person of an army 
of half a million men and failed, partly owing to the Red defence 
\ 
1 
I 
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and partly owing to the immense inundation of the Yang-tse-
Kiang, which stopped all movements of troops. The le'it wing 
of the Kuomintang took advantage of the opportunity to form 
a new independent government at Canton. 
Finally, the Sino-Japanese conflict arose in Manchuria, 
of which we shall speak later. 
VI. Communist propaganda. 
1. HATRED OF FOREIGNERS. 
It is the hatred of foreigners which has most favoured 
communist propaganda in China. 
We have already described the abuses of the Powers in 
this country, and one can understand that it has resulted in 
animosity against their nationals, who were already regarded 
as barbarians for their lack of politeness and their disregard 
of Chinese customs. 
The prestige of the whites in Asia had enormously suffered 
by the victory of little Japan over big Russia, and the World 
War, in which for more than four years the civilised nations 
tore one another to pieces and called the Asiatic peoples to 
their aid, was a still heavier blow to their prestige. The soldiers 
and coolies who saw Europe on that occasion represented it 
in a very bad light to their fellow-citizens. The Chinese, moreover 
were the witnesses in their own country of the terrible misery 
of the Russian refugees. 
Finally, the spread of the cinema in Chinese towns com-
pleted the removal from the whites of their former auriole of 
entirely honorable people. Instead of instructing and educating 
the people, the films chosen contributed to demoralise them and 
to give them a very false idea of our civilisation. 
The contempt which was shown by all the whites more or 
less in regard to the yellow peoples became insupportable, 
especially to those who had studied abroad, where they had 
peen treated as equals. Now, it was these very Chinese who 
placed themselves at the head of the reform party. It was not 
to be surprised at if their nationalism turned to hatred of the 
foreigner. Everything had been done to exasperate them. 
Moscow's propaganda had been able to turn this hatred 
on the part of the leaders and the people to extraordinary 
account. 
Even after the rupture, the Kuomintang aggravated the 
anti-foreign agitation and organised a boycott, accompanied by 
violence against the Japanese. In the same spirit, it instituted 
" days of national humiliation " to recall continually the dis-
agreeable incidents and conflicts with foreigners. It had the 
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school manuals written in such a way as to exalt the feeling 
of injustices suffered and to inflame patriotism by means of 
hatred. 
One cannot help thinking that the Kuomintang is exploiting 
this hatred and that it tries to indicate foreign " scapegoats " 
to prevent the people from recognising those really responsible 
for their miseries, namely their own leaders. 
2. THE RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION. 
To modernise the Chinese Empire it would have been 
necessary to introduce progressive reforms, carefully retaining 
what was good in the older institutions, such as the family 
spirit and the devotion of the authorities to the general interest. 
Wise advisers, chosen among the former European residents, 
would have been very necessary. The reformers, on the contrary, 
were young men, without experience, thinking they knew 
everything, who adopted at the outset the most revolutionary 
ideas, for which their country was in no way prepared. 
We have seen that the Kuomintang assured itself the power 
by the Soviet system, under which a small minority directs 
the elections according to its own will and governs an 
immense empire thanks to methods which are anything but 
democratic . In order to succeed it needed to have a fiercely 
energetic leader, capable of repressing the personal interests 
of all his collaborators. The contrary was the case. From the 
fall of the Empire, the generals took possession of the power, 
each in his own region, put pressure on the people and never 
ceased to make war on one another. The Party was continually 
divided and the politicians, like the military, thought only of 
enriching themselves. 
The Kuomintang thought it right to overthrow all the old 
traditions and customs. It forbade the teaching of the doctrine 
of Confucius, which the three principles of Sun-yat-sen were 
to replace although there was nothing religious about them. 
It forbade the criticism of these principles on pain of death. 
It changed the calendar, suppressed the fetes which the people 
loved, cut off pigtails, etc . In short, its destruction of the 
ancient beliefs and habits was a preparatory work which enor-
mously favoured the spread of bolshevism. 
Although absolutely powerless, public opinion rose up 
against this new regime, which was crushing the country with 
taxes and neglecting its first duty, that of maintaining order 
and governing in the general interest. 
Our men of the Left have always been full of indulgence for 
this nationalist-revolutionary government. For instance, we 
heard the late Albert Thomas, Director of the International 
I 
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Labour Office, describe in glowing terms his visit to the Ministry 
of Public Works at Nankin, and observe with a smile that 95% of 
the employees were occupied solely in propaganda. A few 
months later came the terrible catastrophe of the Yang-tse-
Kiang, which inundated 120,000 square leagues of the most 
fertile land, drowned a mass of victims and occasioned a terrible 
famine, solely because the State had not maintained the dykes. 
We understood then the exasperation of the people who, 
after twenty years of this regime, are ready to welcome any 
lcind of change. In their eyes, communism could not be worse 
than the present state of things. 
3. THE USE OF THE STUDENTS. 
During the last generation, the number of Chinese students 
has considerably increased, both in China and abroad. It is 
estimated that there are at present between six and seven 
million . This would be all to the good if the students were not 
the object of an intense extremist propaganda, which attracts 
them far more than their studies, and if they had not clung 
to the old idea that the State ought to use all of them as officials. 
Now, despite the enormous increase in the bureaucracy, the 
administrative places in the Republic can only occupy a small 
proportion of them and the rest feel aggrieved. 
As the communists carry on intense propaganda among them 
and offer them employment they enter their party in crowds 
and by their youth give it remarkable vitality. Thanks to them, 
the proletarians were attracted into the trades unions, which 
became more and more violent. Thanks to them also, the Red 
troops were better officered than the others, and they disposed 
of numerous propagandists to Sovietise the regions conquered. 
4. THE AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE COMMUNISTS. 
At the beginning, communism had recruited mainly the 
industrial proletarians and students. As the Red troops pro-
gressed, and still more after the rupture, when they were pushed 
back into the scarcely accessible regions of the Centre and the 
South, it desired to gain the support of the agriculturists who 
form the immense majority of the Chinese. 
These peasants, formerly nearly all proprietors, had suffered 
much from the interminable civils wars, from requisitions and 
from crushing taxes . Most of them were in debt and had had 
to sell their lands, of which they were still tenants. The new 
owners were citizens who had become rich by usury or by trade 
with foreigners ; they were naturally detested. 
The communists, as always, were well able to exploit these 
hatreds. As soon as a Red army occupied a region it terrorised 
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it by the mas.sacre and pillage of the rich proprietors. Then 
th~ propagandists instituted a Soviet in each locality, which 
confiscated the large properties and the wealth of the churches 
and convents and divided the lands among the poorest agricul-
turists. Deeds of property and leases were destroyed and 
boundary marks removed from the fields. All who opposed were 
executed. Thus, the communists appeared to the proletarians 
of the country-side as redressers of wrongs and benefactors. 
The neighbouring towns, terrorised, furnished the money 
to avoid sacking and burning ; the Red troops could thus 
always be paid and stole less from the small peasants than the 
nationalists. Thenceforward, they had many sympathisers in 
the country districts ready to supply information and render 
them services. Moreover, to prevent them from changing alle-
giance the communists tattooed their sign on their hands, which 
made them liable to be shot if they fell into the hands of the 
Nankin troops. 
As everywhere, it was mainly the young whom the commu-
nists sought to win over. The young peasants, who formerly 
had no say, were very proud to become more important in the 
Soviets than their elders . They appreciated above all the power 
to take wives without having first to economise in order to 
buy them, often receiving as recompense the daughters of 
executed " reactionaries " . 
In short, it was rare that a Sovietised region returned of 
its own accord to the Nationalists after the departure of the 
Reds. Tho<>e who profited by the new regime feared possible 
vengeance, the victims were dead and those in flight dare not 
return. Where the old beliefs had been destroyed the Soviets 
could count upon jealousy, fear and libertinage to maintain 
their power. 
It may be remarked that in the orth, where the better 
disciplined armies had pillaged the country districts less, the 
communists had little success among the agricultural popula-
tion. 
5. THE CHINESE RED ARMIES . 
The nucleus of these armies is formed of former Nationalist 
soldiers who passed over with their commanders to the Reds 
at the time of the rupture of the Kuomintang with Moscow 
in 1927. At each attempt of Nankin to destroy these communist 
forces, numerous deserters came to reinforce them. Ruined 
peasants and bandits enrolled also, attracted by the bait of 
regular pay and authorised pillage. Female troops, specially 
told off to '' divert " the Red warriors, also served as a means of 
attraction. 
The cadres have nearly all received and continue to receive 
their military instruction in the schools of the U.S.S.R. ; one 
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finds among them non-Chinese elements (Coreans, Annamites, 
Mongols, Bouriates, etc.). 
The armies are somewhat incongruous. They have relatively 
little artillery. 
Concerning the total effectives of the communist armies 
estimates vary widely. We believe that the regular soldiers 
number more than 200,000. Detachments of "Young Com-
munists " and of " Red Militia ", moreover, come to reinforce 
them in times of expeditions. On the other hand, as soon as 
the Government troops arrive in force these auxiliaries hide 
their arms and take on the aspect of peaceable workers. 
The communist bases of operations are generally the 
mountainous or wooded districts, lacking means of communica-
tion and easy to defend. From these regions set forth, sometimes 
from one side sometimes from another, marauding expeditions, 
which have also for object the extension of the Sovietised 
zones. It is a perpetual guerilla warfare against the troops 
of Nankin, with the more or less effective aid of the neigh-
bouring populations. But the R ed troops avoid pitched battles. 
See, on page 29, the annexed map of the communist armies 
and of the Sovietised regions of China. 
6. THE RESULTS. 
According to a Chinese official report, the districts entirely 
Sovietised numbered in 1930 : 
57 in the Province of 
39 
22 
14 
24 
6 
3 
4 
Kangsi; 
Houpeh; 
Hounan; 
Foukien; 
Kwantung; 
Sze-chuan; 
Honan; 
Anhui . 
Surrounding these districts, vast zones within the radius 
of action of Red military expeditions are more or less bolshevised. 
In all these regions production has greatly decreased, trade is 
paralysed and the more distant provinces are cut off from the 
sea. 
Even on the Yang-tse-Kiang, the greatest avenue of pene-
tration into China, which is still in the hands of the Government, 
the constant attacks on boats have almost stopped traffic on 
the middle and upper reaches of the river. The trade of the 
world suffers almost as much as China. 
As for the ravages effected by the Communists, the Govern-
ment valued them on the 5th May 1931 before the "People's 
Convention " for the Province of Kiang-si alone at : 
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186,000 persons massacred, 
2,100,000 persons forced to take flight, 
100,000 houses burned, and 
630,000,000 dollars loss of property. 
One may judge from these figures what a disaster is repre-
sented for China as a whole by the maintenance of communist 
armies in eight provinces despite all the efforts the Government 
has made for six years to destroy them. 
Unless the civilised countries soon bring effective aid to 
Nankin, there is a risk that bolshevism will gain the other 
provinces which are already more or less contamined, for the 
U.S.S .R. is sparing no pains to propagate it. 
7. THE WORK oF Moscow. 
We have several times published detailed information 
concerning the various commissariats of the U.S.S.R., and on 
the organisations of the Comintern which are working to bolshe-
vise China like all the other countries. We will not revert to 
this. 
What we must point out is the number of schools of propa-
gandists for the Far East which were immediately created 
in Siberia, in Russia, and later in China itself. It would be 
tedious to enumerate them all. In Moscow alone, the official 
year book for 1931 records for the training of these special 
agents two universities, nine institutes and study groups, seven 
journals and reviews. There are, in addition, two propaganda 
organisations for China, one through the cinema the other 
through the radio, which utilises the powerful broadcasting 
stations of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, which are heard as 
far as Oceania. 
We have already described the decisive influence of Borodin, 
of Galen (Blucher) and of the numerous civil and military 
specialists who organised the Kuomintang and the Red army 
and so cleverly directed the propaganda. Since the rupture, 
the activity of Moscow has not diminished. Contact is maintained 
by radio, and specialists and arms continue to flow in . The 
munition factory of the Red troops at war against Nankin is 
directed by Russian communists. 
On the 7th November 1931 (the anniversary of the Russian 
revolution) a congress of the communist regions was held at 
Jouit-chin. It voted the constitution of a Central Government 
of the Soviets of China, affiliated to the U.S.S.R., with Mai-Tse-
Ton a pure communist and adversary of any alliance with any 
other Chinese party, as president. 
Moscow is also taking great pains to multiply its lines of 
penetration into China. Its best line, the Trans-Siberian, is 
now supervised by the Japanese; but land lines exist across 
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Outer Mongolia, which has been Sovietised by force and annexed 
to the U.S.S.R., and across Chinese Turkestan, where· Russian 
influence tends to supplant that of Nankin. These two regions 
have become important since the opening of the new strategic 
line from Turkestan to Siberia (the Turksib), which shortens the 
journey of the caravans. 
On orders from Moscow, the new Central Government of 
the Chinese Soviets is doing its best to get possession of a seaport, 
in order to have a direct maritime link with the U.S .S.R. This 
Spring it nearly took Amoy. 
Meanwhile, through its communist organisation of seamen 
and lightermen, Moscow is preparing to cut off the sea commu-
nications of the other countries by strike and by sabotage of 
the vessels . To the south of Amoy maritime piracy has been 
resumed. 
VII. - Summary of events in Manchuria. 
After the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, the European Powers 
<Obliged the Japanese to return the Liaotung peninsula to China. 
A few years later, the Russians installed themselves in their 
place, fortifying Port Arthur and linking up this fortress with 
their Trans-Siberian. In this way, without striking a blow, 
they obtained the upper hand in Manchuria; the Japanese 
were furious. 
The Russians wished to extend their influence also over 
Corea, and the result was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, 
in which the Japanese lost about 100,000 men before they were 
finally victorious at Mukden. For the second time, the Powers 
obliged Japan to restore the conquered territory to China. 
She was only allowed to retain certain leased territories and the 
railway from Port-Arthur to Chang-chun, over which she 
was given the right to place a military guard (about 15,000 men). 
During the world war, the Japanese, allies of the Entente, 
took Kow-chow by force from the Germans. Once again they 
were obliged to give up this conquest, but their rights in Manchu-
ria were extended. 
After having annexed Corea in 1910, the Japanese had 
become the immediate neighbours of Manchuria. They invested 
in this province some two milliard yens, creating factories, 
exploiting iron and coal mines and doing all in their power for 
the development of the country. 230,000 Japanese, as well as 
800,000 Coreans settled there, as well as a mass of Chinese 
lovers of order, who took advantage of the security assured by 
the Japanese troops. In the last ten years, ten million Chinese 
thus went to settle in Southern Manchuria. 
In 1912, the chaos of the Chinese revolution had rendered 
the provinces independent. In Manchuria, an independent 
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Chinese rrtilitary leader, Chang-so-lin, seized the power and 
maintained relative order. He made warlike excursions several 
times in the neighbourhood of Pekin. His son, Chang-Hsue-
Liang, succeeded him. Both of them had continual conflicts 
with Moscow, which sought to sovietise the country by means 
of its agents on the Northern railways. 
In 1929, Chang-Hsue-Lianglost patience and expelled these 
agents. After several useless threats, the Red army of General 
Blucher (the former military advi8er of the Kuomintang) invaded 
Northern Manchuria, committing atrocities on the peaceable 
Russian refugees and several times beating the Manchu troops. 
An irremediable defeat forced Chang-Hsue-Liang to sign a 
capitulation. 
Neither the Government of Nankin nor the League of 
Nations protested. 
Upon a diplomatic observation by the United States con-
cerning the Kellogg Pact, outrageously violated by Moscow, the 
Red army retired. But it took 17,000 soldiers with it as prisoners, 
whom it only surrendered after several months when all the 
Soviet agents had resumed their revolutionary activity, which 
has never ceased since. 
Shortly after, during the war between Nankin and the 
so-called Northern generals, Chang-Hsue-Liang allowed himself 
to be tempted by the promises of Chang-Kai-Chek and came 
with an army as far as Hoang-Ho to give the victory to the 
Nationalists. Nominated vice-Generalissimo, he resided thence-
forward at Pekin reigning over the rich province of Chih-li, 
whilst one of his generals governed for him in Manchuria. 
Communist propaganda was intensified among the population. 
ruined in part as they were by the monetary inflation of Chang-
Hsue-Liang ; troops of bandits organised themselves, and 
security became precarious. 
A night attack against a railway gave a pretext for the 
Japanese detachments to disperse the numerous Chinese troops 
which were occupying Manchuria and to take in hand themselves 
the re-establishment of order. 
Some of the authorities had fled in the wake of the military 
whom they represented, and it was necessary to re-constitute 
them. A new government was created with the support of the 
Japanese, and it placed at its head the heir to the Manchu 
dynasty formerly reigning in China. 
The troops of the new State, the Manchukuo, reorganised 
by Japanese officers, are now collaborating in the re-establish-
ment of order, which will probably take some years yet. 
As might have been expected, the Japanese intervention 
in Manchuria gave rise to protests from Nankin. It occasioned 
in China assaults against the Japanese and increased the boycott 
of their goods . To safeguard their interests, the Japanese 
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landed troops at Shanghai, where they fought bloody battles 
against the 19th communist army and a few troops of Nankin. 
The other Powers put an end to hostilities and the Japanese 
re-embarked. 
* 
* * 
To understand the impossible juridical situation which has 
reigned during recent years in Manchuria one would do well 
to read through the Lytton report, for certain journalists have 
given tendencious extracts. 
This excellent report concludes with " suggestions ", one of 
which seems to us very dangerous : that of suppressing the 
entire military force in Manchuria and being content with 
a simple gendarmerie to maintain order. 
The idea of trusting to a pact of non-aggression with the 
U.S.S.R. as sole guarantee of external security seems to us 
too nai've. 
We know that three years ago the Kellogg Pact had scarcely 
been signed when the Red Army invaded Manchuria and 
destroyed three of Chang-Hsue-Liang's divisions for the mere 
purpose of forcing the latter to tolerate the propaganda of 
Moscow. When this propaganda has achieved its aim is it to be 
supposed that the U.S.S.R. will not profit by it? 
The Soviet Government, the alter ego of the Third Inter-
national, has openly undertaken the task of bolshevising the 
Far East and has already obtained encouraging success there. 
One may rest assured that in this strategic region of first impor-
tance, the best of its lines of penetration into China and Japan, 
it will no more respect a pact of non-aggression than it respected 
the Kellogg Pact. 
Lenin declared moral '' all that is useful to the Communist 
Party " ; Soviet undertakings therefore ought no longer to 
deceive anyone. Georgia, if another example must be cited, 
trusted to the formal recognition of her independence by Moscow 
(7th May 1920) and a few months later the bolshevik army 
crushed it and brought it under the yoke. 
Further, we may recall that in 1927 the U.S.S.R. publicly 
undertook " to support with all its strength the proletarians 
who endeavour to seize the power in their own countries." 
(Official program of the Third International). Now, the pro-
clamation somewhere in Manchuria of a Soviet republic which 
would call for the aid of the Red Army is very easy to organise. 
Between its formal engagement in regard to the proleteriat and 
a " bourgeois " pact of non-aggression one may be sure that the 
U.S.S.R. would not hesitate. 
In the case of revolution fomented and then militarily 
supported, which seems to us the most probable form of aggres-
sion, the Manchu gendarmerie would certainly be swamped. 
-24-
In that case what neighbouring troops could the League of 
Nations call in ? Only the Japanese troops would be ready 
to sacrifice themselves for the defence of that region, in which 
Japan has vital interests. Is it wise to try to drive them away? 
And how can they be forced to go after an occupation of 26 
years? 
We are persuaded that the absence of a good defensive 
army in Manchuria would offer the U.S.S.R. an irresistable 
temptation to sovietise that rich country as it has done the 
great neighbouring province of Outer Mongolia. 
We may note that China did not protest in the latter 
instance, nor did the League of Nations, although it was 
not a question of a disguised protectorate but of an out and out 
annexation. This former Chinese province now figures on the 
maps of the U.S.S.R., the door is closed to international traffic 
and it is Moscow which has the monopoly of its foreign trade. 
\Ve must insist on this precedent and on the lesson it conveys. 
To sum up : If the Japanese were to leave now, it is not 
China which would reign in Manchuria but the U.S.S.R. 
In our opinion, recent events ought to draw attention to 
the desperate situation of the Chinese people as a whole, who 
can no longer be saved from bolshevism except by powerful 
external aid, in which Japan could usefully collaborate. 
VIII. - China and the League of Nations. 
Not being diplomats, we will speak the truth plainly: 
The Chinese Government has been admitted at Geneva and even 
represented on the Council without fulfilling the conditions necessary 
to become a member of the League of Nations; all the present 
difficulties arise out of that. 
When the question of the admission of Iraq was brought 
forward the Council stated, on September 4th 1931, that to 
enjoy the full sovereignty demanded of the members of the 
League a country must : 
(a) have a settled government and an administration 
capable of maintaining the regular operation of essential govern-
ment services ; 
(b) be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and 
political independence ; 
(c) be able to maintain the public peace throughout the 
whole territory ; 
(d) have at its disposal adequate financial resources to 
provide regularly for normal government requirements ; 
(e) possess laws and a judicial organisation which will 
afford equal and regular justice to all. 
. 
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Now, the Chinese Government does not fulfil any Qf these 
five conditions : 
(a) The members of Parliament come from one single small 
party, one-thousandth of the population ; the effective power 
has been seized by the military leaders; all of them exploit the 
country in a shameful manner. 
There is no question of '' maintaining the regular operation 
of essential government services ". 
(b) A great Chinese province, Outer Mongolia, has been 
annexed by the U.S.S.R. In the Central Provinces, to the 
South of the Yang-tse-Kiang, a Soviet power, actively supported 
by the U.S.S.R., has for several years been carrying on a victo-
rious war against the Government of Nankin. Manchuria and 
Thibet have declared themselves independent. There is therefore 
no question of " territorial integrity ". 
(c) It is unnecessary to prove that there is no question 
" maintaining public peace ". 
(d) Despite the crushing arbitrary taxes, the financial 
leakage is such that there is no money left for the most indis-
pensable public works or to pay the troops, who have to resort 
to brigandage in order to live. At Geneva itself, for many years, 
China was not able to pay one penny of its subscription. It 
owes the League more in arrears than all_ the other countries 
put together; yet it is very lightly assessed (it has 110 times 
as many inhabitants as Switzerland and is not assessed even 
three times as highly). 
(e) In the anarchy which reigns, there is no question 
either of " regular justice ". 
In short, it is manifest that this country does not fulfil 
any of the conditions judged indispensable in order to become 
a member of the League of Nations ; when she was admitted 
the League either sinned in ignorance or else desired to cherish 
illusions. 
* 
* * 
It is not in any spirit of disparagement that we draw 
attention to these facts. We admire Chang-kai-chek for having 
energetically taken up position against communism, and we 
hope with all our heart that China will be liberated from this 
scourge and will become free and happy. 
The Chinaman proves his great qualities by succeeding 
everywhere where he is able to work under law and order. 
That is why he settles down so well in all the Far Eastern colonies, 
in Manchuria, and in China itself in the European concessions. 
But, owing to the recent passage from its ancient civilisation to 
more modern ideas, the country is too unsettled, too divided 
and too ill-governed to be able to reorganise itself without 
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powerful external aid. For the same reasons, no one will supply its 
present government with the necessary credits for re-establishing 
order, modernising the country and reforming its administration. 
The League of Nations is the right organisation to help 
China ; it alone can do it in an absolutely disinterested manner; 
this service would be in the best interests of all the members 
without exception. 
If the League of Nations succeeded in saving China from 
its present chaos it would be blessed by the immense majority 
of the Chinese and it would be the best advertisement for the 
League itself. The most sceptical Americans could no longer 
deny its utility. But in order that this intervention should 
succeed it is necessary to look at things as they are and not be 
satisfied any longer with words. 
* 
* * Starting out from the principle that a great military expedition 
is excluded for every sort of reason, what practical method of 
procedure is there ? 
Dr. Legendre, who knows the situation well, had made the 
following suggestions, which seem to us very reasonable. 
He recommends, in the first place, by means of all the 
foreign fleets, to create a police for all the large waterways 
and navigable rivers, which in China constitute the chief means 
of communication and on which stand the chief towns. Thus, 
without great risk, one could rapidly pacify the principal regions, 
arrest the progress of the communist armies and localise the 
conflicts in the interior. 
In the meantime, there should be organised, with well-
chosen foreign cadres and the best elements of the Chinese 
troops, a sort of international police, well-armed and absolutely 
disciplined, capable of re-establishing, little by little, definite 
order in all the provinces. 
It would be necessary at the same time to proceed to the 
progressive disarmament of the millions of soldiers, more or less 
brigands, who are desolating the country. Many of them would 
be very happy to be able to work on the land again without being 
continually held to ransom and pillaged. They should be given 
the opportunity. Others would be employed on great works 
of public utility, in the first place on the upkeep of dykes, long 
dangerously neglected, on canals for navigation and irrigation, 
on the repair of the railways and on the creation of an indis-
'pensable network of roads. With good roads, order would be 
easier to maintain and in case of famine the population could 
be relieved. 
We may add that it would be necessary, as quickly as 
possible, to reorganise the whole system of education, in order 
to get rid completely of subversive propaganda and render the 
studies serious. 
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All this requires time and a great deal of money, but we 
do not think that the question of credits should be insoluble 
if China accepts a temporary control over its finances as several 
European States have done. These great reforms in the public 
interest, and a good administration would in any case cost the 
Chinese less than the continuation of the present frauds. 
We know that Nankin itself desires to reorganise and 
modernise the country as we have indicated. Sun-Yat-Sen had 
planned to do so, but could not find the necessary financial 
support. 
This vast re-organisation should therefore be carried out 
with tact, with " face-saving " for the Government of Chang-
kai-chek but with authority and energy. One ought to be able 
to expect of the patriotism of all the Chinese leaders that, far 
from putting spokes in the wheels, they would make the popu-
lation understand the necessity for all these measures. They 
would also have to react against the anti-foreign movements 
which they have hitherto encouraged. 
Then it would be necessary to help the Government to, 
withdraw the power from the military chiefs, who abuse it 
and to reform the Government so that the interests of the 
people as a whole would be represented. Finally, it would be 
necessary for the laws and administrative methods to be adapted 
to those of civilised countries, to the extent that one might, 
without inconvenience, abrogate the unequal treaties which are 
so detested by Chinese patriots. 
In fact, we demand that the League of Nations place China 
under the conditions of existence required of all its other members 
in conformity with the Covenant. 
By so doing it would be working not only in the interest 
of the Chinese people but also for the maintenance of peace. 
For unless an effort is made now to save this unfortunate people 
the reigning anarchy will certainly drive them into the arms 
of the U.S.S.R. and their neighbours will be obliged, whether 
they like it or not, to defend their vital interests by force of 
arms. One of them has already begun. 
We hope that those countries best informed, owing to the 
nearness of their colonies-France, England and Holland-will 
make the League understand its duty to intervene in the sense 
that we have indicated, for now, if internal and external peace 
is to be restored in China, it is necessary to act, and not temporise 
any longer. 
According to recent information, Japan is contemplating 
an understanding with the U.S.S.R. It goes without saying that 
we regard such a policy as absolutely ill-omened, in the case 
of Japan as of any other country. 
ANNEX 
The communist armies in january 1932 
according to a Chinese official report 
ARMIES CEnTRES OF OPERATIOn I EFFECTIUES 
1st group of armies 
(3,4 and 12) Jouikin 50.000 
3rd group of armies 
(5,8 and 22) South-West of Fukien 50.000 
7th army Lienhwa-Kanchow 10.000 
1st Independent division Lienhwa 2.800 
16th army Hsiuhui 9.500 
10th army North-East of Kiangsi 5.000 
19th army Frontier Kiangsi-Hupeh-Hunan 3.500 
Frontier army Kiangsi-Hunan Chaling 4.500 
6th army Region of Lake Hunghu 10.000 
2nd army West of Hupeh 12.500 
4th group of armies Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei 43.000 (1,9 and 14) 
Total . 200.800 
-
Zones of operations of 
the communist 
The great province of 
Outer Mongolia, which does 
not figure on this map, has 
been sovietised by force and 
annexed to the U. S. S. R. 
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